The Importance of Obtaining a High-Paying Job by Devereux, Paul J.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Importance of Obtaining a
High-Paying Job
Paul J. Devereux
University College Dublin
January 2002
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/49326/
MPRA Paper No. 49326, posted 28. August 2013 20:05 UTC
 THE IMPORTANCE OF OBTAINING A HIGH PAYING JOB*  
 
Paul J. Devereux 
Department of Economics 
University of California, Los Angeles 
devereux@econ.ucla.edu 
 
January, 2002 
 
Abstract 
Given the high level of job mobility in the United States, one might think that obtaining a low-
paying job would have only temporary consequences. However, using longitudinal data, I find 
that state dependence in wages is large and persistent. If two comparable individuals start jobs 
that pay a different wage, about 60% of the wage differential is still present four years later. 
Moreover, about 50% of the wage differential is still present for workers who have switched 
employers during that period. The results indicate that the jobs acquired by individuals have long-
term effects on their future careers. I also examine the mechanisms that lead to state dependence. 
In a stigma model, prospective employers use wages as a signal of ability. Thus, getting a poor 
job can lead the market to believe that an individual has low ability. In the learning-by-doing 
model, workers who get high-paying jobs also attain greater opportunities to acquire human 
capital. The evidence suggests that both stigma and learning by doing models contribute to state 
dependence in wages. 
                                                          
* I thank Joseph Altonji, Guido Imbens, Dale Mortensen, Chris Taber, Sandy Black, Enrico Moretti, Phillip 
Leslie, Dan Ackerberg and Kanika Kapur for helpful conversations. I also thank seminar participants at 
Northwestern, Rochester, UCLA, Washington, Maryland, Yale, and at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta. This research was supported by an Alfred P. Sloan Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship. A previous 
version of this paper circulated under the title State Dependence in Wages: Stigma, Human Capital, or 
Search?. 
 
 2
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Recent contributions in information theory have suggested that taking employment at an 
unskilled job serves as a bad signal for firms hiring workers to skilled jobs.1 These models imply 
that there is state dependence in job quality in that temporary shocks that affect the types of jobs 
workers obtain have large and persistent effects on subsequent wages. However, given the high 
level of job mobility in the United States, it is not clear that job assignment should have long-term 
effects. In this paper, I examine the importance of state dependence in the types of jobs workers 
hold over their careers. One can think of the central issues in terms of the following thought 
experiment. Imagine a group of people who are qualified to do a range of different jobs and hence 
earn a range of different wages. These people are randomly assigned a job within the range of 
jobs that they are qualified to do. If state dependence in wages is important, the initial placement 
the worker receives has large and persistent effects on subsequent job quality and wages. In this 
paper, I show that state dependence in job quality is an important labor market phenomenon. 
Given that there is evidence of significant persistence, I then focus on some potential 
explanations for it. 
The principle problem in estimating the degree of state dependence is individual 
heterogeneity: Individuals who get low-paying jobs are typically less skilled. However, the 
standard method of dealing with unobserved heterogeneity, fixed effects, is inconsistent when 
there is a lagged dependent variable. Therefore, to estimate the importance of state dependence, I 
use instrumental variable techniques. I exploit the fact that the assignment of workers to jobs 
changes over the business cycle. Therefore, I use the state unemployment rate at the time of hire 
as an instrument for the wage and characteristics of the job obtained. A series of specification 
checks indicate that the assumption that the starting state unemployment rate is uncorrelated with 
unobserved ability is a valid one.  
 The second major question this paper answers is why shocks to job quality should have 
persistent effects. I consider several possible mechanisms. The first is simply that jobs persist and 
so long as an individual stays with the same employer, their wage will not change very much. The 
second mechanism is a simple search explanation in which new offers arrive at intervals and so it 
takes time for individuals who start with a low wage to catch up to persons who start with a high 
wage.2 Empirically, I show that it is unlikely that these factors by themselves explain all state 
                                                          
1 See Ma and Weiss (1993) and McCormick (1990). 
2 Mortensen (1986) provides a survey of the search literature. 
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dependence in wages. Thus, I consider stigma and learning by doing explanations for state 
dependence in job quality. 
The stigma model implies that the job held affects the markets perception of a workers 
abilities. Theoretical papers by McCormick (1990) and Ma and Weiss (1993) suggest that taking 
a bad job may be a negative signal to employers. Because the market does not perfectly observe 
ability, it uses job quality as a signal of ability. Thus, exogenously attaining a job that is poor 
relative to ability stigmatizes workers and makes it more difficult for them to get good jobs in 
future. In this paper, I utilize methods pioneered by Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and 
Pierret (2001) to test implications of the stigma model. As such, I extend the recent empirical 
literature that studies the effects of employer learning on wages to the case where employers draw 
inferences about ability from wages.3   
In contrast, the learning by doing explanation is that one's skills are changed by the job 
one gets: Good jobs have greater potential for human capital accumulation, and therefore 
achieving a high wage can be positively correlated with opportunities to acquire skills. In this 
model skill accumulation is a byproduct of working on the job. Even if workers must pay for 
learning opportunities, it is possible for a worker to obtain a job that involves both a higher wage 
and greater learning opportunities. For example, if a worker finds a good match in which he is 
very productive, he may receive a higher wage than if he had found a poor match even after 
paying for the greater learning by doing opportunities available. Thus, if a worker exogenously 
gets a job that is better than his ability would suggest, he may increase his ability through learning 
by doing. Therefore, the job currently held affects his future ability and, hence, the type of job he 
holds in the future. 
The extent of state dependence in wages is important for many reasons. State dependence 
implies that there is a high payoff to labor market search even when job tenures are generally 
short, and hence is an explanation for voluntary unemployment. The strategy of taking a poor job 
and searching on the job may be dominated by continuing to search from unemployment, even if 
search costs from unemployment and employment are similar. Also, the question is relevant to 
assessing the importance of policies designed to facilitate the matching of workers to jobs that 
best exploit their skills. The causes of state dependence are also potentially important to 
distinguish. If workers are stigmatized by taking poor jobs, aggregate fluctuations that affect 
assignment in the labor market can reduce future economy productivity by distorting information 
flows about worker ability. If, instead, state dependence results from greater human capital 
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accumulation on good jobs, then this implies that human capital models should place more 
emphasis on the constraints that workers face in deciding whether to invest. It would also indicate 
the importance of retraining for workers who have been displaced to less-skilled jobs. 
Before proceeding further, it is useful to discuss the relationship between this study and 
the previous literature. There is little research that studies the importance of job assignment to 
future wages or that empirically investigates the mechanisms that cause such persistence. There 
is, however, a related literature on wage dynamics and the covariance structure of earnings.4 The 
emphasis of these papers differs from that of the current paper in that they do not test for causal 
relationships between current and future wages. Rather, the models in these papers assume that 
there is no state dependence in earnings but that earnings residuals are correlated over time. Thus, 
a common interpretation is that the wage residual measures unobserved ability, and negative first 
order autocovariances in wage changes reflect investment in human capital and subsequent 
payoff. There is a fundamental difference between state dependence and serially correlated errors. 
With state dependence the job one gets causally affects the jobs held in future, with serially 
correlated errors, there is just some correlation over time in the wages earned by workers. Note 
that the earnings dynamics literature typically does not model jobs and job changes in any way. 
Thus the results from this literature do not in any way imply that there is a persistent benefit to 
getting a high-paying job.  
Another related paper is that by Beaudry and DiNardo (1991). They show that the 
national unemployment rate when a worker starts a job has a negative effect on wages on that job 
even after conditioning on the current unemployment rate. This paper expands on their work by 
quantifying the effect of getting a high-paying job on future wages without conditioning on the 
worker staying with the same employer: Indeed, I show that there is state dependence in wages 
even when workers switch jobs. I also add to the literature by exploring stigma and human capital 
accumulation mechanisms for state dependence. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: In section 2, I describe the data set. In section 3, 
I discuss the econometric difficulties in estimating dynamic models with individual heterogeneity, 
outline the techniques that I use, and present the empirical results for the state dependence 
specifications. In section 4, I describe a series of specification checks for the state dependence 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001) study the signaling value of education in the 
context of a learning model in which the market learns about worker productivity by observing output 
realizations. 
4 See Kearl (1988), Hause (1980), Parent (1995), Abowd and Card (1989), Topel and Ward (1992), Farber 
and Gibbons (1996), MaCurdy (1982), Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), and Geweke and Keane 
(1997) amongst others. 
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estimates. In section 5, I examine the possible state dependence mechanisms including search, 
stigma, and learning by doing. Section 6 summarizes the results and concludes. 
 
2. DATA 
 
 The data used throughout this paper come from the 1971 to 1992 survey years of the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). This data set was chosen because it extends over a long 
time period and is representative of the working age population of the United States. The PSID is 
composed of both a random sample and a poverty subsample. I use observations from both 
samples to increase the precision of the estimates; the estimates are similar when just the random 
sample is included. I restrict the sample to men between the ages of 21 and 55 who are not self-
employed and are not retired. I exclude observations from Hawaii and Alaska. In the analysis to 
estimate the importance of state dependence, I only use post-1976 observations. However, data 
before 1976 are used when previous values of variables are required. 
There are two potential wage measures in the PSID: the reported hourly wage rate and 
annual average hourly earnings. I have chosen to use the reported wage as it is specific to the 
current job. For hourly workers this variable is the reported hourly wage. For workers paid 
weekly, monthly, or annually, it is the amount paid divided by a fixed number of hours. For 
example, for weekly workers, the wage rate is created by dividing weekly earnings by forty 
hours. Since the hourly wage is topcoded at $9.98 in 1976 and 1977, many wage observations in 
those years are topcoded. In these cases average hourly earnings for the year have been used to 
predict the wage. Wages are deflated by the GDP consumption deflator.  
The analysis in this paper requires the identification of job moves. Two tenure questions 
are asked in the data: How long have you been in your present position? and, how long have 
you worked for your current employer?. These data allow one to determine when employer 
changes, and position changes within firms, occur. I partition the data into spells with employers 
using the method recommended by Brown and Light (1992). An individual is assumed to have 
started a spell with a new employer when tenure with the employer is less than the elapsed time 
since the survey date. Before 1976 the tenure data in the PSID is bracketed. If reported tenure in 
these years is less than one year then I assume that the worker has started a new job. If tenure is 
greater than one year, I assume that the job is the same as the job held in the previous year. Table 
1 contains means of selected variables. 
 One strength of the PSID data is that respondents who report less than one year of tenure 
on their current job are asked about what happened to their previous job. The responses are coded 
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as being a quit, a displacement because of plant closing, or as a firing/layoff. As we will see, it 
turns out to be useful to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary transitions in the analysis. 
 
3.  MEASURING STATE DEPENDENCE IN WAGES 
 
The Estimation Equation 
In this section I examine whether the type of job a worker obtains has long-term career 
implications. I take a sample of job starters and analyze how the job they hold up to 5 years later 
depends on the type of job they start. I choose a time period of five years as this is a long enough 
period to be considered long-term but is short enough for me to have a reasonable number of 
observations on workers present in both periods. This question is central to understanding the 
importance of assignment to future wages in the labor market. If the assignment a worker obtains 
still has large effects on wages several years later, it implies that temporary shocks that affect 
assignment have large effects on the careers of workers. I use the wage on the job as a proxy for 
the quality of the job. There are other job characteristics that are important to workers but wages 
are generally assumed to be the most important.  
Suppose we observe a group of people starting new jobs at time t. We are interested in 
the extent to which the wage they attain at time t affects the wage they earn some time later, say, 
at time τ. To answer this descriptive question, it is quite natural to write a specification such as 
equation (1) 
 
ττττ ββββ iititi vuuxww ++++= −143/21  (1) 
ττ ηiii fv +=  
 
Here, wit is the log of the wage of person i at time t, xit is a vector of control variables, and uτ is 
the state unemployment rate at τ. The vector of control variables include personal characteristics 
at t, the log of the wage at t, a full set of state indicators, and a quadratic time trend. The 
individual characteristics I include are labor actual market experience, experience squared, 
experience cubed, and indicators for whether married, whether has a college degree, whether has 
a high school diploma, and an indicator for whether white. I report OLS estimates to provide a 
comparison point for the later estimates. The results are in table 2. The OLS estimates show a 
decline in the coefficient on wit from about 0.7 at t+1 to about 0.57 at t+4 and t+5. 
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Estimation Issues 
The error (viτ) is assumed to be composed of an individual effect (fi), and a, possibly 
serially correlated, idiosyncratic component ηiτ. The xit and uτ variables are assumed to be strictly 
exogenous given the unobservable individual effect, fi. There are a number of econometric 
problems that cause OLS estimates of equation (1) to be biased. The principal problem is the 
correlation of the wage with the individual effect because people with greater ability will tend to 
have better jobs. Because of this unobserved heterogeneity, there will be a spurious positive 
correlation between wiτ and wit that arises because  0),( >iit fwCov . This will tend to bias the 
estimate of β1  upwards. 
The  presence of individual effects that are potentially correlated with the regressors is a 
serious problem in a dynamic model such as model (1). The fixed effect response of OLS on 
deviations from individual means is inconsistent in dynamic models because taking deviations 
from individual means induces a correlation of order 1/T between the lagged dependent variable 
and the error (Nickell, 1981). The most common response to this problem is to first difference the 
equation to remove the effects, and then to estimate by instrumental variables, using wit-1 and 
further lags of the dependent variable as instruments for ∆wit (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982). In the 
absence of measurement error and serially correlated errors, this method produces consistent but 
inefficient estimates. Recent Monte Carlo results (Arellano and Bover, 1995) suggest that small 
sample biases can be very substantial when the variance of the individual effect and the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable are large. In the presence of serially uncorrelated 
measurement error in wi,t-1, only wi,t-2 and further lags of the wage are valid instruments. In this 
case the following moment conditions hold:  
E(wi,t-2∆viτ) = 0 and E(wi,t-2∆wit) < 0 
The explanatory power of the levels in wages in the presence of measurement error is small, so 
with measurement error one is likely to suffer more serious biases than these Monte Carlo results 
suggest. For this reason, I do not use this method in the estimation. 
 
Using Lagged Wage Changes as Instruments 
 Arellano and Bover (1995) suggest applying predetermined, but not necessarily 
exogenous, variables in the level equation as first differenced instruments. If the model is 
stationary and the correlation between the predetermined variables and the individual effect is 
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time invariant, these variables are valid instruments.5 In particular, the first difference of the 
lagged dependent variable may be used as an instrument (that is, ∆wit may be used as an 
instrument for wit). The following moment conditions apply: E(viτ∆wit) = 0 and E(wit∆wit) > 0. 
This is the first instrument I use in this analysis. The results using this instrument are reported in 
the second row of table 2. As can be seen in the second column, this instrument has a strong first 
stage. The 2SLS result is that the coefficient on wit is 0.187 (0.045) after four years. This estimate 
is much lower than the corresponding OLS estimate. However the instrument used is not robust to 
the presence of measurement error in the wage because the measurement error in the instrument 
is correlated with the measurement error in wit. Thus the 2SLS estimates are likely to be 
downwardly biased.6 
With serially uncorrelated measurement error, ∆wit can be replaced as an instrument by  
∆wit-1. In row 3 of table 4, the instrument for wit is wit-1  wit-2, while in row 3 the instrument is the 
log of average hourly earnings at t (eit) minus the log of average hourly earnings at t-1. The 
assumption with this latter instrument is that measurement error in average hourly earnings is 
uncorrelated with measurement error in the reported wage.7 Because of measurement error, the 
relationship between the instrument and the predetermined variable is much weaker in rows 3 and 
4 than in row 1. However, the instrument is still highly correlated with wit. Using these 
instruments changes the estimate of state dependence radically. The coefficient at t+4 rises to 
0.616 (0.176) when wi,t-1  wi,t-2 is used as an instrument, and to 0.646 (0.137) when eit  ei,t-1 is 
used as the instrument. The change in the coefficient on wit indicates the importance of taking 
account of measurement error in the wage. In the t+1 regression, the coefficient on wit is greater 
than one when eit  ei,t-1 is used as the instrument. This probably occurs because average hourly 
earnings at t may include earnings from many jobs held in that year. Thus, if an individual 
changes jobs during year t, eit is a function of the wage of the job held at t+1 and the instrument is 
correlated with the error term. This should not be a serious problem for the regressions 
subsequent to t+1. 
                                                          
5 This stationarity assumption implies that there is zero covariance between the individual effect and wage 
changes. This assumption is consistent with the findings of Abowd and Card (1989) and MacCurdy (1992) 
that use the PSID data. However, Baker (1997) provides evidence that wage growth is faster for more 
highly paid workers. 
6 Validation studies have found measurment error in earnings in the PSID to be quite severe  (Bound, 
Brown, Duncan, and Rodgers, 1994). To my knowledge, the wage measure used in this paper has not been 
validated. 
7 Since the information on reported wages and the information on earnings for any particular year are 
collected in different years, measurement error may not be highly correlated in the two measures. Average 
hourly earnings is computed over the calender year and so, unlike the reported wage, it is not a point in 
time measure. 
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Using the State Unemployment Rate 
 The wage instruments are not robust to certain types of serial correlation in the error 
term. If, for example, a worker becomes more productive and so gets a high wit relative to his 
previous wages, then the error term will be positively correlated with ∆wit. This is likely to bias 
the estimates upwards. A similar problem arises if there are changes in worker tastes as he starts a 
new job. If the changes in tastes are persistent, then the error is positively correlated with wit. 
Another possibility is that a worker may invest in skills on one job (and accept a lower wage to 
finance the general training) in order to learn skills required for a better one. In this case the error 
will be negatively correlated with ∆wit. Estimates are biased upwards if there is positive serial 
correlation in the errors; they are biased downwards if the serial correlation is negative. 
Therefore, positive coefficients on the lagged wage using the wage instruments may be because 
of serial correlation in the errors rather than state dependence. 8 
Therefore, I also use the state unemployment rate (ut) as an instrument. The intuition is 
that the state unemployment rate at t affects the type of job a searching worker attains at t. One 
can think of the state unemployment rate as exogenously affecting the types of jobs that searching 
workers obtain.9 Therefore, the unemployment rate when the job held at t started is correlated 
with the quality of job started at t. If the starting unemployment rate is uncorrelated with ability, 
then it will only affect wiτ through its effects on wit and, hence, it is a valid instrument for wit 
provided that one controls for uτ and uτ-1. 10 Two stage least squares estimation with the starting 
state unemployment rate instrument is robust to measurement error in the wage because 
measurement error in the starting unemployment rate is unlikely to be correlated with 
measurement error in the wage. The instrument is valid if it is not correlated with the error term 
(viτ). 
In the fifth row of table 2, I include the estimation results when the starting state 
unemployment rate is used as the instrument for wit. The maintained assumption in these rows is 
                                                          
8 Even with significant serial correlation, biases need not be enormous: For example, suppose half the 
variance of wage changes occurs due to random shocks, and the other half is the result of a serially 
correlated AR(1) process. Consider a case where there is no true state dependence and we use the ∆wit-1 
instrument. If the autoregressive coefficient is 0.8, then the estimated coefficient on wit would be 0.32 at 
t+1 falling to 0.13 at t+5. If the autoregressive coefficient is 0.5, the estimated coefficient on wit would be 
0.13 at t+1 and 0.01 at t+5. 
9 As suggested by Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), cyclical conditions may also affect the wages of job 
starters because they affect the implicit contracts that agreed upon between workers and firms. According 
to this interpretation, cyclical conditions when the match start may affect wages but not affect the types of 
jobs that workers are doing. 
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that the state unemployment rate is uncorrelated with unobserved ability or tastes. The first stage 
shows that this instrument is strongly negatively correlated with wit. The estimated levels of state 
dependence after 4 and 5 years are similar to when wage differences are used as instruments. The 
conclusion of strong state dependence remains. The estimates that use the state unemployment 
rate instrument are my preferred results because these are robust to measurement error in wages, 
serial correlation in the errors and to breaches of the assumption that the wage process is 
stationary.11 One should not take the estimate for t+1 seriously when the state unemployment rate 
instrument is used because the estimating equation includes ut and this is extremely highly 
correlated with the state unemployment rate when the job at t started. 
There is a fundamental problem with the starting unemployment rate instrument if stigma 
is the reason for state dependence. If the market has any signal about the starting unemployment 
rate of the worker, they will put some weight on this information in determining the workers 
ability. Thus, in this scenario, the starting unemployment rate belongs in the regression, and if it 
is used as an instrument, it is correlated with the error. The stigma story implies that this 
correlation will be positive. Therefore, the coefficient on wit will be biased downwards.12 
 
Is there state dependence in Job types as well as wages? 
Thus far, wages have been used, at least in part, to proxy for job quality. To verify that 
there also is state dependence in the types of jobs people hold, I construct a variable called the 
predicted wage. The predicted wage is the wage predicted from job characteristics. I create this 
variable by regressing the log wage on indicators for two-digit industry, two-digit occupation, 
union coverage, salaried, and government for the full sample that includes job starters and job 
stayers. The predicted wage is the predicted value from this regression. I use this variable because 
it complements the information about persistence in wages by indicating the extent to which job 
characteristics such as industry and occupation are persistent. The results using this variable are in 
table 3. On the whole, the estimates are quite similar but less precise than the results for wages. 
One exception is that the estimate using the state unemployment rate instrument for t+5 shows no 
evidence that job characteristics persist for 5 years. The other estimates in the table, however, do 
suggest substantial persistence over 4 and 5 years. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
10 These controls ensure that the starting unemployment rate does not affect wages due to correlations 
between the starting unemployment rate and the unemployment rate at τ. 
11 The reported standard errors take account of correlations in the error resulting from multiple observations 
on individuals. 
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4. SPECIFICATION CHECKS FOR THE STARTING UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
INSTRUMENT 
 
Solon, Barskey, and Parker (1994) conclude that the average ability of the workforce is 
higher in recessions. If it is the case that the average ability of job starters is also higher when the 
state unemployment rate is high, then this would bias the estimates of state dependence using the 
state unemployment instrument downwards. Below, I carry out some checks that suggest that the 
starting unemployment rate is not correlated with ability to any significant extent.  
First, I check whether the starting unemployment rate is correlated with observable 
characteristics of workers on the basis that if it is correlated with observables it is probably 
correlated with unobservables. I regress the starting state unemployment rate on the state 
indicators, the quadratic time trend, and on individual characteristics. The coefficients on the 
individual characteristics are reported in the table below: 
 
Married 0.032 
(0.046) 
College Degree 0.056 
(0.057) 
High School diploma -0.039 
(0.047) 
Experience -0.019 
(0.025) 
Experience Squared 0.0003 
(0.0017) 
Experience Cubed 0.00001 
(0.00003) 
White 0.058 
(0.047) 
 
As can be seen, none of the variables in this regression has any predictive power for the 
starting unemployment rate. An F test confirms the visual impression that one cannot reject that 
all these coefficients are zero at conventional significance levels. Thus, the starting 
unemployment rate appears to be random with respect to observed characteristics of individuals. 
 If the 2SLS estimates in table 2 are biased upwards because the starting unemployment 
rate is negatively correlated with unobserved ability, then one should find positive coefficients on 
                                                                                                                                                                             
12 It may be reasonable to assume that employers do not know the cyclical conditions that existed when a 
worker was hired on a previous job. To obtain this information, an employer must know exactly when the 
employee was hired, and what the unemployment rate was at that time. 
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wit when the dependent variable is a previous value of the wage and one uses the starting 
unemployment rate as the instrument. The 2SLS estimate from the regression of wit-2 on wit is -
0.167 (0.287).13 The equivalent estimate for the predicted wage is 0.022 (0.288). Failure to find a 
significantly positive coefficient in this regression suggests that the starting unemployment rate is 
not negatively correlated with ability so the estimates in tables 2 and 3 are not biased upwards. As 
is appropriate in this quasi-experimental setting, conditional on the observables, wages prior to 
the job start are unrelated to the starting unemployment rate. Then, wages when the job starts and 
subsequently are negatively related to the starting unemployment rate. 
 
Additional Specification Checks: 
Table 4 contains estimates using the starting unemployment rate instrument from several  
different specifications of the dynamic wage model. As can be seen in the table, the estimates are 
quite robust to specification. I outline the rationale behind these checks in detail below. 
 
Adding Interactions of the personal characteristics with the quadratic time trend: 
 The period under study was one of rising wage inequality. If there is some spurious 
correlation between changes in relative wages and the state unemployment rate, these relative 
wage changes could lead to bias. I allow the education, experience, and race premiums to vary 
over this time period by interacting these variables with the quadratic time trend. This has little 
effect on the estimates 
 
Adding Year Indicators: 
 I replace the quadratic time trend with a full set of year indicators in case there are year 
specific-factors that affect wages and are correlated with the starting state unemployment rate. 
One practical effect of adding the year dummies is to condition out variation in the state 
unemployment rate that is correlated with the national business cycle. The first stage remains 
strong but the 2SLS estimates are less precisely estimated than in table 2. The point estimates of 
state dependence are higher than in table 2. 
 
Adding Controls for Voluntary or Involuntary Separation: 
Workers are more likely to experience involuntary separations in recessions. If laidoff 
workers are of lower quality, this could induce a negative relationship between the starting 
                                                          
13 I dont do the equivalent regression for wit-1 because the starting unemployment rate is extremely highly 
correlated with the state unemployment rate at t-1. 
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unemployment rate and ability. As a check on this possibility, I add controls for whether workers 
started their previous job because of a quit, or started their previous job because they were 
involuntarily separated. With these extra controls, I find estimates of state dependence that are 
similar in magnitude to the estimates in table 2. Thus, it seems that the greater likelihood that job 
starters in recession are separated involuntarily is not exerting a serious bias on the state 
dependence results.14 
 
Adding Controls for the Average unemployment rate of the individual and the average starting 
unemployment rate of the individual: 
Solon, Barskey, and Parker (1994) report that the skill composition of the employed 
changes over the business cycle. I take the correlated random effects approach of specifying the 
individual effect as a function of the mean value of the state unemployment rate for the 
individual. To do this, I calculate the mean value of the state unemployment rate for each period 
in which the person is employed at the interview date. I also calculate the mean starting state 
unemployment rate for each individual. Then, these two variables are added as extra controls in 
the state dependence specifications. Once again, the estimates do not change very much. 
 
Excluding the Poverty Sample: 
One further objection to the results in table 2 is that the sample includes both the random  
sample and the poverty sample components of the PSID. Therefore, I present the estimates when 
the poverty sample is excluded. Once again, the results are quite similar to the results in table 2. 
The point estimates on the coefficient on wit are slightly higher then with the full sample but, 
given the precision of the estimates, it is difficult to see how the amount of state dependence 
differs between the random sample and the full sample. 
 
Using the same individuals in each year: 
One feature to note about table 2 is that there are different numbers of cases in each year. 
In row 6 of table 4, I restrict the sample to cases where the relevant variables are present in every 
year to ensure that the estimated profile is not contaminated by having a different sample in each 
year. Reassuringly, the profile when the same observations are used in each year is quite similar 
to the profile in table 2.15 
                                                          
14 I have also tried including lagged tenure and interactions of lagged tenure with the voluntary and 
involuntary termination variables. The estimates remain very similar. 
15 Similarly, I have verified that differences in the estimates across the wage and starting unemployment 
rate instruments in table 2 are not the result of differing samples. 
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Weighting the Sample to Correct for Attrition and Non-Employment: 
 Many wage observations are missing because of attrition and non-employment at the 
survey date. Using a selection on observables approach, I weight each observation by the inverse 
of the predicted probability of being present in the sample. I report estimates in table 4 using 
weights that correct for attrition only, and weights that control for both non-employment and 
attrition. Details about the attrition problem and the methodology used to address it are in 
appendix 1. In the first set of results the weights are the inverse of the estimated probability of not 
attriting from the PSID between t and τ, in the second set of results the weights are the inverse of 
the estimated probability of having complete data at τ. The weighted 2SLS estimates are similar 
to the estimates in table 2 but the point estimates are generally lower. This reflects the fact that 
individuals who have characteristics that make them more likely to attrit or be nonemployed have 
less persistent wages. 
 
Replacing missing wages with average hourly earnings: 
 There are many cases where the individual remains a PSID respondent but wage data is 
missing (see appendix 1 for details). In the final row of table 4, I report results where average 
hourly earnings is used to proxy for missing wages. For example, at t+4, of the 1103 cases where 
the wage is missing, there are valid observations on average hourly earnings at t+4 for 853 cases. 
In this manner, it is possible to check whether missing wages that do not result from attrition are 
biasing the results. The exercise indicates that it is unlikely that selection due to missing wages 
has a major effect on the estimates of state dependence in table 2. 
 
Conclusions on the extent of State Dependence in Wages: 
Since the results that are robust to measurement error all have reasonably large levels of 
state dependence, my conclusion is that getting a bad job has large and persistent effects on the 
subsequent careers of workers. The estimates with the starting state unemployment rate 
instrument imply that if two identical workers start different jobs, approximately 60% of the wage 
differential remains four years later. This is a substantial amount of state dependence. Since only 
one third of the workers are in the same job at t+4 that they started at t, one might have thought 
that the job started would not be so important. However, the results imply that cyclical shocks 
that affect the assignments workers receive have major long-term implications in labor markets. 
Given the finding of state dependence in wages, I now examine why this substantial state 
dependence might arise. 
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5. STATE DEPENENCE MECHANISMS 
 
Is State Dependence Purely Because Jobs Persist? 
One explanation for state dependence in wages is that, if a worker gets a high wage job, 
the wage of that worker remains high over time because he remains on the same job. 
Furthermore, there may be implicit contracts or nominal rigidities that cause wages within jobs to 
be particularly persistent. Thus, before moving on to discuss other explanations for state 
dependence, it is important to determine that state dependence in wages does not purely result 
from the fact that jobs persist. To examine this issue, I estimate the regressions on a sample of 
individuals who have changed employers at least once between t and τ. Using the state 
unemployment rate instrument, I find that the coefficient on wit is 0.566 (0.210) when the 
dependent variable is wit+4 and the sample is restricted to individuals who have switched 
employers between t and t+4. The analogous coefficient on wit in the t+5 regression is 0.545 
(0.253). The estimates from these regressions are also around 0.5 when the wage instruments that 
are robust to measurement error are used. Thus, the effect of getting a high wage job at t persists 
even if workers subsequently switch jobs. 
 
Can a Search Model Explain all State Dependence in Wages? 
Even without human capital accumulation or stigma, the quality of job obtained may 
influence future job quality by affecting the reservation wage required to switch to a new job. In 
this search explanation wage offers arrive periodically. Thus, it takes time for individuals who 
start with a low wage to catch up to persons who start with a high wage. The fact that the effects 
of wit persist for four or five years is indicative that a pure search explanation is unlikely to be the 
only model. Unless offers are received very infrequently, one would expect the search mechanism 
to phase out the effects of the initial allocation reasonably quickly. 
An indicator of whether state dependence is solely caused by search considerations is 
available when one looks at people who have been involuntarily separated from their previous 
job. In a search framework, the quality of job obtained influences future job quality because there 
is an asset value to the current match. If a worker is involuntarily terminated from his current 
match, this asset value becomes zero. This reasoning suggests the following test for whether the 
search story alone can explain state dependence. Take only workers who start a new job after an 
involuntary separation from their old job. Estimate how the wage on their new job depends on the 
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wage on their old job. If there is state dependence in the wages of these workers, it implies that 
search considerations alone do not explain all state dependence in job quality.16 
I take all cases where a job starts and pick out cases where the worker reports it ends 
involuntarily. For these cases, I regress the first wage on the subsequent job on the last wage on 
the job started at t. As before, I use the starting unemployment rate as the instrument for the wage 
on the job started at t. For the 986 such cases, the estimated coefficient on the wage is 0.637 
(0.209). This suggests that the wage on jobs started subsequent to an involunary termination from 
the previous job are strongly dependent on the last wage on the previous job. This implies that the 
type of job a worker holds may change the ability of the worker or the markets perception of the 
ability of the worker.17 In the next sections, I examine the evidence for these explanations. 
 
Testing For Stigma 
In a stigma model, the type of job a searching worker obtains is influenced both by noisy 
signals of ability and by exogenous shocks. Since the market does not know the value of 
realizations of past values of the shock, workers who receive poor draws, and so get bad jobs, will 
appear to have lower ability than they really have. Therefore, workers who exogenously attain a 
poor job are stigmatized if potential employers use the wage as a signal of ability. In appendix 2, I 
formally develop a stigma model. The implication of the model that I use to test for stigma is that 
over time in a match, the employer learns more about the worker's productivity and so places less 
weight on the last wage on the previous job as a signal of the worker's ability. My approach is 
analogous to that of Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001) who examine 
whether employers use education as a signal of ability. 
As shown in proposition 1 in appendix 2, the stigma model has the following implication: 
As tenure with an employer increases, the interactions of tenure with hard to observe variables 
that are correlated with productivity have positive coefficients in a wage equation and, when 
these interactions are included, the interactions of tenure with productivity-enhancing variables 
that are observed by employers when the match formed should become negative. I assume that 
                                                          
16 In my sample, 63 percent of the involuntary separations are layoffs. It is possible that some of these 
involuntary separations are temporary layoffs where the worker expected recall but received a better offer 
while waiting. In this case the asset value of the match remains for the worker. Other research indicates that 
about 75 percent of laid off workers expect to be recalled, and 72 percent of workers who expect recall are 
subsequently recalled (Katz and Meyer, 1990). These numbers would imply that only 13 percent of workers 
who start jobs with new employers after an involuntary separation expected to be recalled by their previous 
employer. 
17 It could also be the case that the wage on the previous job affects the reservation wage for some irrational 
reason. For example, the worker may be unwilling to accept a lower wage than the one in the previous job 
because of pride. 
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the last wage on the previous job is observed by the employer when the worker is hired. I assume 
that fathers education, mothers education, and the final wage on the job previous to the previous 
job are not fully observed by the employer when the worker is hired. However, these variables are 
correlated with productivity on the job and, hence, the signals the employer sees as the worker 
acquires tenure. The stigma model implies that when interactions of these variables with tenure 
are included in a wage equation, the interaction of the previous wage with tenure should become 
negative.18 
The empirical specification is that the current wage is a function of the last wage on the 
previous job, fathers and mothers education, tenure, and interactions of tenure with previous 
wage and with parents education. I also include controls for tenure squared, a cubic in 
experience, indicators for married, high school graduate, college graduate, white, a quadratic time 
trend, and the state indicator variables. Because tenure is correlated with both worker quality and 
match quality, the OLS coefficients may suffer from heterogeneity bias. Therefore, I also estimate 
an equation that includes match fixed effects.19 The identification in this specification is solely 
from changes over time within employer-employee matches. 
 The results are in tables 5 and 6. I concentrate on the match fixed effects results because 
they are robust to unobserved individual and match heterogeneity. In column 4 of table 5, the 
only tenure interaction is the interaction of tenure with the previous wage. The coefficient on the 
interaction is -0.0014 (0.0017). The stigma model implies that, with no other interactions, the 
coefficient on the interaction of tenure with the last wage on the previous job should be close to 
zero. The reasoning is that if employers use the information in the previous wage efficiently in 
setting the first wage on the job, subsequent wage changes should not be correlated with the last 
wage on the previous job. 
In column 2 of table 5, I report the coefficients when the only tenure interactions are with 
parents' education. These interactions have positive coefficients in keeping with the notion that 
they are correlated with information that is revealed as the match progresses. When, in column 6, 
all three interactions are included, the coefficient on the previous wage interaction becomes 
negative and statistically significant. These results are consistent with the predictions of the 
                                                          
18 The econometric implications of statistical discrimination models like the stigma model have been 
explored by Altonji and Pierret (1995). Altonji and Pierret show that if there is a productivity-enhancing 
variable, s, that is observed by employers and a variable, z, that is unobserved by employers but correlated 
with productivity, the coefficient on the interaction of s with time is likely to be negative and the coefficient 
on the interaction of z with time positive. Their paper explores the effects of a public information model 
and their empirical specifications interact s and z with experience in the labor market. 
19 There is a sizeable empirical literature that stresses the importance of taking account of individual and 
match heterogeneity when estimating the return to tenure. See, for example, Topel (1991) and Altonji and 
Shakotko (1987). 
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stigma model  the previous wage becomes less important in determining wages as more 
information about the worker is acquired. 
The results in table 5 are also consistent with a human capital explanation whereby ability 
proxied by parents education is more closely related to human capital accumulation than the last 
wage on the previous job. Thus, over time on the job, parents education becomes more important 
in determining wages.20 For this reason, I now carry out the analysis using the last wage on the 
job previous to the previous job as the partially observed variable. It is unlikely that this wage is 
more correlated with human capital accumulation than the last wage on the previous job. The 
results are presented in table 6.21 Once again, I focus on the results from the match fixed effects 
specification. As predicted by the stigma model, the coefficient on the last wage on the job 
previous to the previous job interacted with tenure is positive and when this interaction is added 
to the wage equation, the interaction of the last wage on the previous job with tenure becomes 
significantly negative. The coefficients here are of some economic significance. The coefficients 
of -0.008 and 0.008 in column 6 of table 8 imply that if a worker accumulates 5 years of tenure, 
the weight on the old information falls by 0.04 and the weight on the new information rises by 
0.04. This indicates a substantial reweighting from old to new information about worker ability 
over the course of the match. The results suggest that employers do use the last wage on the 
previous job as a signal of ability and that this signal becomes less important as new information 
is acquired about the employee. 
  
Testing the Learning by Doing Explanation 
If a worker exogenously gets a job that is better than his ability would suggest, he may 
increase his ability through learning by doing or other human capital accumulation mechanisms. 
Even if workers must pay for learning opportunities, it is possible for a worker to obtain a job that 
involves both a higher wage and greater learning opportunities. For example, if a worker finds a 
good match in which he is very productive, he may receive a higher wage than if he had found a 
poor match even after paying for the greater learning by doing opportunities available. 22 
                                                          
20 This possibility is supported by the fact that when I add the interaction of education and tenure to the 
wage equation, the previous wage interaction becomes more negative, and the coefficients on the parents 
education interactions become smaller. The coefficient of the education interaction itself is strongly 
positive, and it is larger in size than the coefficients on the parents education interactions. 
21 There are fewer observations used in this table because an individual must have started at least two jobs 
during the sample period in order to have information on the last wage in the job previous to the previous 
job. 
22 There is a substantial literature that studies the incidence on training. The findings indicate that the 
incidence and duration of training is positively related to firm size and to starting wages. (See Altonji and 
Spletzer ,1991, Bronars and Famulari, 1994). 
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  In 1976, 1978, and 1985, respondents were asked the following question: 
 
On a job like yours, how long would it take the average new person to become fully trained and 
qualified?23 
 
I assume that jobs in which the average new person takes a lot of time to become fully 
trained and qualified are jobs that offer a lot of opportunities for learning by doing. This variable 
has been widely used as a measure of learning by doing and as a proxy for training (Duncan and 
Hoffman, 1979; Brown, 1989; Mincer, 1988). Similar questions in other data sets have been used 
as a training measure (Barron, Black, and Loewenstein, 1993). It is generally found that this 
variable and other training variables are positively related to wages. However, high-paying jobs 
will tend to be held by high ability workers so it is not clear that if a worker gets a job that pays 
better than his usual job that there are more opportunities for learning by doing. This is the 
hypothesis I test in this section. 
Because the training question is asked only in 1976, 1978, and 1985, there are no 
observations with this information for jobs that start after 1985. If a job is observed in one of 
these three years, I attach the value reported in that year to all years of the job. For example, if a 
person starts a job in 1982 and is still in the same job in 1985, I attach the answer to the question 
in 1985 to the observation in 1982 and all other years of the job. If I have multiple answers to this 
question for a job because it is observed in at least two of the three years, I take the mean of the 
answers and use this value in each period of the job. Thus, I have information on learning by 
doing opportunities for many jobs that do not start in any of the three periods.24 
I test whether conditional on ability, workers get more learning by doing opportunities if 
they get a high-paying job. Thus, for the sample of job starters for whom the learning by doing 
information is available, I regress the log of months of required training (LBD) on the starting 
wage rate and on a set of worker characteristics: 
  
itiititit vfxwLBD +++=
/
21 ββ  (2) 
 
I have experimented with different functional forms for LBD such as using months rather 
than log(months) and the qualitative result is robust to functional form. Once again, the main 
problem in estimating this equation is unobserved heterogeneity that is positively correlated with 
                                                          
23 For other work based on this question, see Brown (1989), and Mincer (1988). 
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the wage. Unlike in the state dependence estimation, fixed effects is consistent here because there 
is no lagged dependent variable. Therefore, this is the estimation method I use to estimate 
equation (2). I have also tried using the state unemployment rate as an instrument for this 
estimation but because the data is only available for a limited number of years, there is no first 
stage. 
The results of the learning by doing data analysis are in table 7. The sample is composed 
of new hires only. In table 10, I test how the amount of required training on the job depends on 
the starting wage. In column 1, I present OLS results for the regression of months of required 
training on the first wage on the job and worker characteristics. The results indicate that jobs that 
pay well also provide greater opportunities for learning. The significant coefficients on some of 
the worker characteristics indicate that these characteristics have large effects on the amount of 
required training. Thus, it is likely that the coefficient on the starting wage is biased upwards 
because of unobserved worker heterogeneity. Therefore, in column 2, I present fixed effects 
estimates of the equation. The coefficient on the starting wage falls somewhat from column 1 but 
is still large and statistically significant. It does appear that if a worker attains a job with a high 
starting wage, he also has greater opportunities to learn new skills.25 
One remaining issue is whether the skills acquired are specific to the job or are more 
general in nature. I have verified that taking a job with a lot of required training increases wages 
on subsequent jobs (results available on request). Thus, when workers get a good job with good 
learning by doing opportunities, at least some of the skills acquired are useful on other jobs.26 The 
evidence indicates that learning by doing explanations may be relevant to explaining state 
dependence in wages. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS  
 
In this paper, I have used various instrumental variables estimators to determine the 
extent of state dependence in wages and job quality. My conclusion is that there is a substantial 
amount of state dependence in wages. If two identical individuals start jobs that pay a different 
wage, about 60% of the wage differential is still present four years later. Also, approximately 
                                                                                                                                                                             
24 Using information on only jobs that start in one of these three years gives similar but less precise results. 
25 It is possible that wages are high on jobs that offer greater learning opportunities because the training 
increases productivity and wages. By using only the first reported wage on the job in the analysis, I ensure 
that it is unlikely that this effect is driving the result. In fact, human capital theory would suggest that 
wages should be temporarily low during training, especially if the training is general. 
26 Brown (1983), Duncan and Hoffman (1979), and Mincer (1988) also find, using the same variable, that 
learning by doing opportunities have a positive effect on wage growth. 
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50% of the wage differential is still present even for men who change employers during the four 
years. The results indicate that the labor market that matches workers to jobs is far removed from 
the frictionless perfectly competitive model. In practice, the job a searching worker attains is 
influenced by factors other than skills and talents. Most importantly, this randomness influences 
the job holdings and wages of individuals to a significant extent for a long period of time. 
I have also examined the roles played by different models of state dependence. The first 
conclusion is that state dependence in wages does not purely arise because jobs persist. The 
second conclusion is that state dependence goes beyond what would be predicted by a simple 
search model in which ones wage affects ones reservation wage but not the wage offer 
distribution faced. Therefore, I have considered evidence for stigma and learning for doing 
explanations. The evidence suggests that both of these explanations have some relevance. 
Workers who attain better jobs can increase their skills and hence their future job offers. This 
implies that human capital models should place more emphasis on the differential opportunities to 
acquire human capital that exist in different jobs. It also indicates the importance of retraining for 
workers who have been displaced to less-skilled jobs. The evidence also suggests that taking a 
bad job is a negative signal to the market. Thus, exogenously attaining a job that is poor relative 
to ability stigmatizes workers and makes it more difficult for them to get good jobs and high 
wages in future. As such, the results add to the growing empirical literature that indicates that 
information models are relevant to understanding labor market dynamics. 
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Table 1: Means of Selected Variables: PSID 1976-1992 (Standard Deviations in Parenthesis) 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Variable All Employed New Hires 
Years of Education 12.80 12.66 
 (2.48) (2.40) 
University Degree 0.26 0.22 
 (0.44) (0.42) 
High School Diploma 0.51 0.51 
 (0.50) (0.50) 
Mothers Education 11.02 11.05 
 (2.86) (2.77) 
White 0.69 0.66 
 (0.46) (0.48) 
Father's Education 10.54 10.56 
 (3.34) (3.36) 
Years of Experience 13.93 11.69 
 (8.15) (7.59) 
Government 0.18 0.12 
 (0.38) (0.33) 
Salaried 0.41 0.32 
 (0.49) (0.48) 
Months of Tenure with Employer 47.47 5.81 
 (56.03) (3.66) 
New Job 0.29 1 
 (0.45) (0) 
Log of Average Hourly Earnings 2.29 2.09 
 (0.56) (0.57) 
Log wage 2.20 2.04 
 (0.50) (0.51) 
Predicted Wage 2.11 2.04 
 (0.31) (0.32) 
Months to be fully trained 20.29 17.41 
 (24.75) (23.19) 
No of Observations 26871 7675 
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 Table 2: Effect of Wage at t on Future Wages For Those Who Start Jobs at t 
 
ττττ ηββββ iiititi fuuxww +++++= −143/21  
 
Instrument 1st Stage 
Coefficient 
on 
Instrument 
wiτ = wit+1 wiτ = wit+2 wiτ = wit+3 wiτ = wit+4 wiτ = wit+5 
       
OLS  0.705 
(0.014) 
[5668] 
0.658 
(0.015) 
[4953] 
0.613 
(0.019) 
[4327] 
0.562 
(0.021) 
[3758] 
0.575 
(0.023) 
[3255] 
       
wit  wit-1 0.480 
(0.018) 
0.408 
(0.036) 
[4347] 
0.314 
(0.036) 
[3797] 
0.272 
(0.043) 
[3293] 
0.187 
(0.045) 
[2873] 
0.184 
(0.047) 
[2461] 
       
wit-1  wit-2 0.189 
(0.033) 
0.890 
(0.179) 
[2747] 
0.825 
(0.177) 
[2393] 
0.604 
(0.198) 
[2088] 
0.616 
(0.176) 
[1823] 
0.543 
(0.220) 
[1534] 
       
eit  eit-1 0.101 
(0.015) 
1.576 
(0.189) 
[4554] 
0.910 
(0.136) 
[3971] 
0.953 
(0.151) 
[3432] 
0.646 
(0.137) 
[2987] 
0.573 
(0.139) 
[2566] 
       
SUt -0.023 
(0.004) 
0.439 
(0.149) 
[5668] 
0.519 
(0.121) 
[4953] 
0.705 
(0.157) 
[4327] 
0.610 
(0.175) 
[3758] 
0.583 
(0.224) 
[3255] 
       
 
The estimates in the table are the coefficients on wit from each specification. 
Also included in each specification are experience, experience squared, experience cubed, indicators for 
college degree, high school graduate, married, and white, the state unemployment rate at τ, the state 
unemployment rate at τ-1, state dummies, and a quadratic time trend. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses account for repeated observations on individuals. 
The first stage estimates reported are from the t+4 regressions. The first stages in other years are similar. 
SUt is the starting state unemployment rate of the job started at t. 
The number of observations used in each specification is in square brackets. 
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 Table 3: Effect of Predicted  Wage at t on Future Predicted Wages For Those Who Start 
Jobs at t 
 
ττττ ηββββ iiititi fuuxpwpw +++++= −143/21  
 
Instrument 1st Stage 
Coefficient 
on 
Instrument 
pwiτ= pwit+1 pwiτ= pwit+2 pwiτ= pwit+3 pwiτ= pwit+4 pwiτ= pwit+5
       
OLS  0.626 
(0.013) 
[5668] 
0.516 
(0.016) 
[4953] 
0.496 
(0.017) 
[4327] 
0.467 
(0.190) 
[3758] 
0.435 
(0.022) 
[3255] 
       
pwit  pwit-1 0.461 
(0.017) 
0.350 
(0.033) 
[4347] 
0.222 
(0.036) 
[3797] 
0.157 
(0.039) 
[3293] 
0.176 
(0.042) 
[2873] 
0.181 
(0.045) 
[2461] 
       
pwit-1  
pwit-2 
0.070 
(0.025) 
0.982 
(0.285) 
[2747] 
0.847 
(0.304) 
[2393] 
0.811 
(0.329) 
[2088] 
0.758 
(0.384) 
[1823] 
0.486 
(0.351) 
[1534] 
       
eit  eit-1 0.038 
(0.010) 
1.017 
(0.252) 
[4554] 
0.263 
(0.220) 
[3971] 
0.890 
(0.397) 
[3432] 
0.687 
(0.264) 
[2987] 
0.737 
(0.348) 
[2566] 
       
SUt -0.014 
(0.003) 
No First 
Stage 
0.673 
(0.207) 
[4953] 
0.608 
(0.216) 
[4327] 
0.483 
(0.195) 
[3758] 
0.019 
(0.246) 
[3255] 
       
 
The estimates in the table are the coefficients on pwit (the predicted wage) from each specification. 
Also included in each specification are experience, experience squared, experience cubed, indicators for 
college degree, high school graduate, married, and white, the state unemployment rate at τ, the state 
unemployment rate at τ-1, state dummies, and a quadratic time trend. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses account for repeated observations on individuals. 
The first stage estimates reported are from the t+4 regressions. The first stages in other years are similar. 
SUt is the starting unemployment rate of the job started at t. 
The number of observations used in each specification is in square brackets. 
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Table 4: Effect of Wage at t on Future Wages For Persons Who Start Jobs at t 
(Specification Checks for starting Unemployment Rate Instrument) 
 
Specification Check wit+1 wit+2 wit+3 wit+4 wit+5 
      
Adding interactions of personal 
characteristics with the quadratic time 
trend 
0.405 
(0.162) 
[5668] 
0.499 
(0.125) 
[4953] 
0.690 
(0.164) 
[4327] 
0.591 
(0.180) 
[3758] 
0.571 
(0.231) 
[3255] 
      
Adding Year Indicators 0.717 
(0.203) 
[5668] 
0.634 
(0.244) 
[4953] 
0.747 
(0.263) 
[4327] 
0.668 
(0.304) 
[3758] 
0.862 
(0.355) 
[3255] 
      
Adding controls for whether job started as 
a result of a voluntary or involuntary 
termination 
0.424 
(0.157) 
[5668] 
0.509 
(0.135) 
[4953] 
0.737 
(0.181) 
[4327] 
0.647 
(0.202) 
[3758] 
0.579 
(0.273) 
[3255] 
      
Adding Controls for the mean state 
unemployment rate while the individual is 
employed and the mean starting 
unemployment rate of the individual 
0.526 
(0.148) 
[5668] 
0.612 
(0.116) 
[4953] 
0.714 
(0.143) 
[4327] 
0.535 
(0.173) 
[3758] 
0.497 
(0.210) 
[3255] 
      
Excluding Poverty Sample 0.653 
(0.168) 
[3169] 
0.511 
(0.172) 
[2822] 
0.543 
(0.245) 
[2495] 
0.744 
(0.258) 
[2187] 
0.611 
(0.317) 
[1925] 
      
Maintaining Constant Sample in each year 0.427 
(0.277) 
[2139] 
0.411 
(0.187) 
[2139] 
0.778 
(0.212) 
[2139] 
0.762 
(0.230) 
[2139] 
0.656 
(0.287) 
[2139] 
      
Weighting for Attrition 0.380 
(0.161) 
[5668] 
0.543 
(0.120) 
[4953] 
0.688 
(0.159) 
[4327] 
0.589 
(0.170) 
[3758] 
0.498 
(0.219) 
[3255] 
      
Weighting for Attrition and Missing Wages 0.398 
(0.156) 
[5668] 
0.521 
(0.125) 
[4953] 
0.651 
(0.164) 
[4327] 
0.533 
(0.180) 
[3758] 
0.496 
(0.226) 
[3255] 
      
Replacing missing wages with average 
hourly earnings 
0.386 
(0.186) 
[6646] 
0.478 
(0.137) 
[5907] 
0.701 
(0.173) 
[5233] 
0.689 
(0.197) 
[4611] 
0.418 
(0.266) 
[4045] 
      
 
The estimates in the table are the coefficients on wit (the predicted wage) from each specification. 
Also included in each specification are experience, experience squared, experience cubed, indicators for 
college degree, high school graduate, married, and white, the state unemployment rate at τ, the state 
unemployment rate at τ-1, state dummies, and a quadratic time trend. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses account for repeated observations on individuals. 
All specifications are estimated by 2SLS with the starting unemployment rate used as the instrument. 
The number of observations used in each specification is in square brackets. 
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Table 5: The Effects of Wage on Previous Job and Parents Schooling 
on Wages: Ordinary Least Squares and Match Fixed Effects 
 
 
 
 Ordinary Least Squares Match Fixed Effects 
Observations: 11550 
(2803 Matches) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Previous Wage 0.551 
(0.020) 
0.524 
(0.021) 
0.566 
(0.021) 
   
Mothers Education 0.0036 
(0.0028) 
-0.0026 
(0.0027) 
-0.0034 
(0.0031) 
   
Fathers Education 0.0069 
(0.0024) 
0.0028 
(0.0027) 
0.0022 
(0.0027) 
   
Previous Wage * 
Tenure(years) 
-0.0089 
(0.0044) 
 -0.0134 
(0.0044) 
-0.0014 
(0.0017) 
 -0.0043 
(0.0018) 
Mothers Education * 
Tenure(years) 
 0.0019 
(0.0007) 
0.0021 
(0.0007) 
 0.0010 
(0.0003) 
0.0011 
(0.0003) 
Fathers Education* 
Tenure(years) 
 0.0014 
(0.0007) 
0.0016 
(0.0007) 
 0.0009 
(0.0003) 
0.0010 
(0.0003) 
 
 
Also included in the equation are experience, experience squared, experience cubed, indicators for college 
degree, high school graduate, married, and white, the state unemployment rate at τ, the state unemployment 
rate at τ-1, state dummies, a quadratic time trend, and a quadratic in tenure. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses account for repeated observations on individuals. 
Matches that only last for one period are omitted. 
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Table 6: The Effects of Wage on Previous Job and the Wage on Job 
Previous to Previous Job on Wages: 
Ordinary Least Squares and Match Fixed Effects 
 
 
 
 Ordinary Least Squares Match Fixed Effects 
Observations: 7276 
1831 Matches 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Previous Wage 0.441 
(0.028) 
0.389 
(0.033) 
0.443 
(0.030) 
   
Lagged Previous 
Wage 
0.232 
(0.029) 
0.266 
(0.029) 
0.229 
(0.031) 
   
Previous Wage * 
Tenure(years) 
-0.017 
(0.007) 
 -0.018 
(0.012) 
-0.0034 
(0.0020) 
 -0.0076 
(0.0026) 
Lagged Previous 
Wage * 
Tenure(years) 
 -0.011 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
 0.0023 
(0.0023) 
0.0076 
(0.0029) 
 
Also included in the equation are experience, experience squared, experience cubed, indicators for college 
degree, high school graduate, married, and white, the state unemployment rate at τ, the state unemployment 
rate at τ-1, state dummies, a quadratic time trend, and a quadratic in tenure. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses account for repeated observations on individuals. 
Matches that only last for one period are omitted. 
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 Table 7: Determinants of Length of Time Required for Average 
Worker to Become Qualified, New Hires 
 
Dependent Variable: Log (Time Required) 
 
Variable 
 
OLS 
 
Fixed Effects 
 
Log (Wage) 1.125 
(0.083) 
0.524 
(0.206) 
Married 0.170 
(0.074) 
0.145 
(0.205) 
Years of Experience 0.021 
(0.034) 
0.030 
(0.257) 
Experience 
Squared/100 
-0.008 
(0.232) 
-0.696 
(0.491) 
Experience 
Cubed/10000 
-0.071 
(0.452) 
1.431 
(0.917) 
College Degree 0.442 
(0.097) 
 
High School 
Graduate 
0.137 
(0.082) 
 
White 0.504 
(0.080) 
 
 
There are 1929 observations on 1536 people. 
Also included in the equation are experience, experience squared, experience cubed, indicators for college 
degree, high school graduate, married, and white, the state unemployment rate at τ, the state unemployment 
rate at τ-1, state dummies, a quadratic time trend, and a quadratic in tenure. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses account for repeated observations on individuals.  
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Appendix 1: Sample Attrition 
Because of attrition and non-employment many future wages are unobserved. The issues 
are similar in all the regressions; for exposition purposes I detail the situation for the wage at t+4. 
While there are 7675 observations on job starts at time t with valid wages, there are only 3758 
observations at t+4 with non-missing wages and non-missing observations on the other variables 
used in the analysis. There are several reasons for the non-availability of these 3917 cases. First, 
1930 cases are missing because the job starts after 1988 and hence we do not follow people long 
enough to observe the wage at t+4. Second, the attrition of subjects from the PSID survey is 
responsible for 884 of the missing cases. Third, of those that remain in the survey, 716 are non-
employed at the survey date and hence have missing wage data. Fourth, 387 people are employed 
at the survey period at t+4 but have missing wage data. For most of these people, wage data is 
missing because they are not paid either hourly or salaried. 
Obviously, there are selection issues that arise because the data is non-missing at t+4 in a 
non-random fashion. It is well known that the probability of attriting from the PSID is related to 
the observable characteristics of workers and to their wages at t. (for example, see Fitzgerald, 
Gottschalk, and Moffitt, 1998).  Likewise, the probability of not working at t+4 may depend on 
wages at t. Therefore, this issue requires some attention.  
A formal approach to the missing data problem is to model the probability that a worker 
will have non-missing data at t+4. I allow the probability of attrition to depend on the variables 
that are always observed, wit and xit in this case, but I do not allow dependence on the variable 
that is missing for some units, wi,t+4. Let Di be an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if 
there is full data for an individual at t+4 and zero otherwise. 
),(),,|1Pr( 4,4, itititittitiititi xwgxXwWwWD ===== ++  (A1) 
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with g(.) unknown. The estimation of this model is carried out in two steps. In the first stage, I 
estimate a probit model that conditions the probability of attrition on wit and xit.27 The predicted 
probabilities from the probit model are used to form weights and these weights are used to weight 
the observations in the 2SLS estimation in the second step. The weights are equal to the inverse 
of the probability of not attriting between t and t+4.  
This is referred to as Missing at Random (Little and Rubin, 1987). The argument is that 
there is nothing in the data that suggests that units that drop out are systematically different from 
units who do not drop out once we condition on all observed variables. This model has some 
intuitive appeal. Consider a unit that drops out between t and t+4 with values of the observed 
variables equal to itititit xXandwW == . The Missing at Random assumption implies that for 
our best guess of the value of the missing variable Wi,t+4, we should look at values of Wi,t+4 for 
units with the exact same values of wit and xit. 
The results of the estimation are contained in table A1. Column 1 of table A1 contains the 
derivatives from probit estimation of the probability that a person does not attrit from the PSID 
between t and t+4. The probability of attriting is lower for people with higher wages at t, persons 
with college degrees, married people, and white people. In the second column of table A1, I 
report the derivatives from probit estimation of the probability that all relevant data is present at 
t+4 given it is present at t. Clearly, persons with missing data at t+4 differ from persons with 
complete data. Observations present at t+4 have higher wages at t, are more likely to have a 
college degree at t, are more likely to be married at t, and are more likely to be white. 
 
                                                          
27 I allow the latent variable to depend on the explanatory variables in a linear fashion in the probit 
estimation. However, adding interactions of the wage at t with the x variables and other non-linearities does 
not change the weighted 2SLS results to any appreciable extent. 
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Table A1: Probit Estimates of Probability Worker who starts Job at t has valid data at t+4 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Probability still PSID 
respondent at t+4 (Probit 1) 
Probability employed at t+4 
with valid observations on 
wage and other covariates 
(Probit 2) 
Number of Observations:  Derivatives Derivatives 
Wit 0.034 
(0.011) 
0.077 
(0.018) 
College Degree 0.040 
(0.014) 
0.126 
(0.022) 
High School Graduate -0.042 
(0.012) 
0.018 
(0.019) 
Married 0.022 
(0.010) 
0.031 
(0.018) 
State Unemployment Rate 0.004 
(0.003) 
0.010 
(0.004) 
White 0.059 
(0.013) 
0.090 
(0.020) 
Experience at t 0.001 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
Experience at t Squared/100 -0.001 
(0.038) 
-0.028 
(0.055) 
Experience at t Cubed/10000 0.001 
(0.073) 
0.048 
(0.103) 
 
Also included in the equation are experience, experience squared, experience cubed, indicators for college 
degree, high school graduate, married, and white, the state unemployment rate at τ, the state unemployment 
rate at τ-1, state dummies, a quadratic time trend, and a quadratic in tenure. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses account for repeated observations on individuals 
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Appendix 2: A Stigma Model 
In this model, the type of job a searching worker obtains is influenced both by noisy 
signals of ability and by exogenous shocks. Since the market does not know the value of 
realizations of past values of the shock, workers who receive poor draws and get bad jobs will 
appear to have lower ability than they really have. Therefore workers who exogenously attain a 
poor job are stigmatized if employers use job quality as a signal of ability. 
 
Assumptions 
(i)  There is a group of workers who vary in terms of ability ( a ) but are observationally 
equivalent. All these workers look for a job at time one.  
(ii)  Each period the market sees a noisy signal (θ) of ability. This signal has the following 
distribution: θ~ ( , / )N a r1 . The signal is iid. 
(iii) A searching worker gets a job of quality w E a It t t= +( | ) ε  where It is the information set 
available to the market at t.28 I define a job as a match with an employer. Except in period 1, 
when there is no previous wage to be observed, the markets information set at t consists of 
the wage at t-1 and the signal emitted at t. The market is assumed to use Bayes law to update 
beliefs about the workers abilities. The noise in the wage allocation process reflects luck that 
causes workers to get jobs that over or understate their ability. I assume that ε σε~ ( , )N 0
2 .  
(iv) The current employer sees a normally distributed signal, η, of the workers ability each 
period. I assume that η is more precise than θ because the employer has an informational 
advantage over the market. The precision of η is k. The employers information set at t is Ωt. 
This information set contains the last wage on the workers previous job, the value of θ that 
the market observed when the worker was hired, and all the realizations of η since the worker 
started the job. 
(v)  Workers can quit to another job if they get a better offer. Also, matches end exogenously with 
a certain probability. 
                                                          
28 For simplicity, I assume that workers accept this offer. It would be optimal for workers to accept an offer 
if the present value of doing so exceeds the present value of waiting for a better offer. Since poor jobs are 
stigmatizing, sometimes it will be optimal to wait. 
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(vi) The offer to a worker from his current employer is w w E a vt t t t
0
1 1= + − +−α α( ) ( | )Ω . The 
value of α reflects the extent to which the employers wage offer adjusts to his new 
information about worker ability.29 I assume that α is an exogenous constant. 
 
Proposition I 
(a)  There is state dependence in job quality. In other words, a worker's wage at t depends on his 
wage at t-1. A poor draw of ε1 reduces w1 and thus reduces w2 because 
w w2 1 1 2 2 2= + +Π Π. .θ ε ; where Π1, Π2 > 0. 
(b)  As tenure on any job increases, the employer places less weight on the last wage on the 
previous job. Also less weight is placed on the realization of θ at the start of the job. 
Increased weight is placed on realizations of η as these are observed over time. 
 
The proof of  (a) is as follows. At time one, the market determines the expected value of the 
workers ability and sets w1. At time two, the market sees w1 and θ2. The market updates its 
expectation of each worker's ability in a bayesian fashion. Thus the posterior expectation is 
E a w
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w
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Competition implies that if the worker changes employer, w w2 1 1 2 2 2= + +Π Π. .θ ε  
The current employer sees a normally distributed signal, η2, of the workers ability. The 
employers information set is {θ1, η2}. Then, the employers estimate of the ability of the worker 
is 
E a
r k
r k
( | , )η θ θ η2 1 1 2=
+
+




. 
The employers offer is w w E a v2
0
1 2 1 21= + − +α α η θ( ) ( | , ) . 
Therefore, whether the worker separates from the job or not, the wage at time two depends on the 
wage at time one. One can see that a poor draw of ε1 stigmatizes the worker in the sense that the 
markets expectation of his ability is less than his true ability and less than his employers 
estimate of his ability. 
 
                                                          
29 Since η is not observed by the market, employers may not have to raise wages for workers with high 
realizations of η. However, employers will want to place more capable employees into positions of 
responsibility (Waldman, 1984). If the market infers ability from the position of the worker, the employer 
will be forced to raise wages for workers who have high values of η. 
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To prove part (b), note that in period three the market receives the signal θ3, but the employer 
instead sees the signal η3. Assume the worker started his current job at time 2. The employers 
information set is now {w1, θ2, η3}. The information set of the outside market is {w2, θ3}. The 
employer and the market both update their beliefs about the workers ability. The precision of the 
posterior distribution of a  when the worker begins a new job is just the sum of the precision of 
the prior and the precision of the signal. Thus,  
Pr ( ( | , ))ecision E a w
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The bayesian update of the employers belief is 
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Π Π .  
The employers offer is w w E a w v3
0
2 3 2 1 31= + − +α α η θ( ) ( | , , ) . One can easily verify that 
compared to w w2 1 1 2 2 2= + +Π Π. .θ ε , the weights on w1 and θ2 have fallen, and the weight on 
η3 is now positive. Thus, the weights on the signals observed at the start of the job fall with 
tenure on the job and, as tenure increases, greater weight is placed on variables that are correlated 
with productivity but not fully reflected in the initial signal and in the previous wage.  
  
